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A cerebral process is the conscience ".
In order to establish l`identità of the conscience with sure cerebral processes it would be necessary to show that the introspettive observations brought back from the subject can be reported in the terms of the processes that are known are taken place in its brain.
The human beings could be victims of one dangerous illusion of fenomenologico-idealistic type. Such illusion consists to nell`attribuire a greater cognitive reliability all`universo of the feelings and the thoughts placed in the space of the conscience or dell`io. Before our subjective outlines come, and then the things, conditioned from our outlines come.
If the conscience is a cerebral process, then presumablly it could be an electronic process.
The principle is, a lot simply, than the mind, indeed the same man like being pensante/agente, is one machine.
The difference between a man and a stone would then consist only nell`estremamente complex material structure that is found in the living body and that it is absent in the stone.
As someone has observed, the conclusion of all that and that, when we use termini/concetti mental, we are (unconsciously) speaking about the physical states that, of fact, play roles motives.
In this fisicalista/materialista vision a computer could not only simulate, but quite reproduce of the mental states. Penrose supports l`esistenza of a sub-quantistico level of the truth. It appeals to a such microscopical level in order to justify the appearance of the conscience, like product of sub-quantici effects in the complex of the cerebral processes.
Charon supports that the electrons are in truth of the aeons, microscopical black holes, tunnel of communication between our universe and a universe of light in which the events they organize being such universe parallel to decreasing entropy.
That to say then of the thought it orients them that asserts the supremacy of the conscience regarding the matter? For Putnam a possibility to construct intelligent computers it demonstrates not as well as that the mental men and their states are something of physicist, how much that determined functions and performances can reproduced (or better be simulated) from agencies or various organs. Intelligence and memory are not therefore identifiable with neurocerebrali processes.
The descriptions dell`organizzazione work them of a system are of logically various nature are from the descriptions of its physicist-chemical composition, are from the descriptions of its behavior upgrade them. Identical psychological phenomena can derive from various neurological mechanisms; the nervous system produces indistinguishable psychological effects with different physiological means.
Therefore it is necessary to reject l`idea that for every psychological state you it must be one and a single cerebral state correspondent. Also supposing that a computer can be behaved in all and for all as a human being we could say that e` it same human? It would have to reproduce all a series of complex typical elaborations of our psiche, would not only have to be umanizzato to level of performances, but to a deep psychological level.
Hour the psychological processes are riducibili to processes merely physicists?
Category: General Engineering
Type: Glossaries and Dictionaries
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